

the Confederate centre, which was responded to with spirit by the battalions of Colonel Stephen D. Lee and Major Shoemaker. This practice having continued for an hour, both sides relapsed into silence. This was the prelude to the approaching contest. Between twelve and one o'clock the cannonade was resumed in earnest. The thunder of cannon shook the hills, while shot and shell, shrieking and hissing, filled the air, and the sulphurous smoke, settling in black clouds along the intervening valley, hung like a pall over the heavy columns of infantry which rushed into the "jaws of death." Pope, having directed his principal attack upon the Confederate left, advanced his infantry in powerful force against Jackson, whose single line behind the friendly shelter of railroad cuts and embankments received this mighty array with tremendous volleys of musketry, hurling back line after line, only to be replaced by fresh assailants. Each moment the conflict became closer and more deadly. At times the roar of musketry gave place to the clash of bayonets, and at one point, after the Confederates had exhausted their ammunition, the assailants were repelled with stones which had been thrown up from a neighboring excavation. At the critical moment when the fate of Jackson's corps was trembling in the balance, Colonel Lee dashed with his artillery into a position that enfiladed the Federal right wing and hurled upon it a storm of shot and shell. At the same moment Longstreet's infantry rushed like a tempest against Pope's left, driving everything before it. This assault was irresistible, and speedily decided the fortune of the day. Pope's left wing gave way before it at every point, and his right, being assailed in flank and threatened in rear, relaxed its efforts and began to retire.

The Confederates, seeing the enemy in retreat, pursued with a shout that rose above the din of battle, and pressed him with such vigor that he soon fell into disorder and broke into rapid flight toward Bull Run. The pursuit was continued until arrested by the cover of night. After the storm of battle the field presented a scene of dreadful carnage. Thirty thousand men *hors de combat*, wrecks of batteries and the mangled carcasses of horses, gave proof of the desperate character of the

conflict. Pope left upon the field 15,000 killed, wounded, and prisoners, while his army was greatly reduced by stragglers, who, imbued with the sentiment, "He who fights and runs away will live to fight another day," sought refuge far beyond the range of battle. The Confederate loss was also heavy, the killed and wounded being numbered at between 7000 and 8000. Beside the heavy losses in *personnel* sustained by the Federals, a large amount of valuable property fell into the hands of the victor, the most important of which was twenty-five thousand stand of small-arms and twenty-three pieces of artillery; also a large amount of medical stores was subsequently taken at Centreville.

Pope retired to Centreville, where he was opportunely joined by Generals Sumner and Franklin with 25,000 fresh troops, upon which Pope endeavored to rally his army.

General Lee, being well aware that powerful reinforcements from McClellan's and Burnside's armies and from other sources had been ordered to join Pope, did not deem it advisable to immediately pursue the retreating enemy, but prudently paused to ascertain what force he had to contend with before renewing the conflict. After the close of the battle Colonel Long made a personal reconnaissance of the whole field and reported to Lee. Wishing to strike the enemy another blow before he could recover from the effects of his repulse, Lee by rapid movement turned Centreville on the 1st of September, and took a position on the Little River turnpike, between Chantilly and Ox Hill, with the view of intercepting his retreat to Washington. This movement was covered by Robertson's cavalry, while Stuart advanced to Germantown, a small village a few miles east of Ox Hill, where he discovered the Federal army in retreat. After a sharp attack Stuart was obliged to retire before a superior force. About dusk A. P. Hill's division encountered a large detachment of the enemy at Ox Hill. A brief but sanguinary combat ensued, whose dramatic effect was greatly heightened by a furious thunderstorm, which burst upon the combatants almost simultaneously with the clash of arms. A singular opportunity was thus presented for contrasting the warring of the elements with the strife of man, and

of comparing the acts of man with the power of Omnipotence. It was seen how greatly peals of thunder and vivid lightning, intensified by the darkness of night, enfeebled the flash and roar of musketry and cannon. The combatants being separated by night and storm, Hill's division occupied the field, while the Federals resumed the retreat. In this engagement they numbered among their slain two distinguished officers (Generals Kearny and Stephens), whose loss was regretted by friends in both armies. Pope made good his retreat during the night, and we once more see the fugitives from Manassas seeking a refuge within the defences of Washington.

Since Pope, on assuming the command of the Army of the Potomac, expressed his disregard for lines of communication and plans of operation, declaring that his headquarters should always be found in the saddle, it may be interesting to know the effect the advantage taken by Lee of this novelty in the art of war had upon the Federal authorities in Washington. I shall therefore introduce some of the correspondence between President Lincoln, McClellan, Halleck, and Pope:

“August 29, 1862—2.30 P. M.

“What news from direction of Manassas Junction? What generally?

“A. LINCOLN.”

“August 29, 1862—2.45 P. M.

“The last news I received from direction of Manassas was from stragglers, to the effect that the enemy was evacuating Centreville and retiring toward Thoroughfare Gap. This is by no means reliable.

“I am clear that one of two courses should be adopted: First, to concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope; second, to leave Pope to get out of his scrape, and at once use all our means to make the capital perfectly safe. No middle course will now answer. Tell me what you wish me to do, and I will do all in my power to accomplish it. I wish to know what my orders and authority are. I ask for nothing, but will obey whatever orders

you give. I only ask a prompt decision, that I may at once give the necessary orders. It will not do to delay longer.

“GEO. B. McCLELLAN,  
“*Major-general.*”

“August 29, 1862.

“Yours of to-day just received. I think your first alternative—to wit, to concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope—is the right one. But I wish not to control. That I now leave to General Halleck, aided by your counsels.

“A. LINCOLN.”

“August 29, 1862.

“I think you had better place Sumner’s corps, as it arrives, near the fortifications, and particularly at the Chain Bridge. The principal thing to be feared now is a cavalry raid into this city, especially in the night-time. Use Cox’s and Tyler’s brigades and the new troops for the same object, if you need them. Porter writes to Burnside from Bristoe, 9.30 P. M. yesterday, that Pope’s forces were then moving on Manassas, and that Burnside would soon hear of them by way of Alexandria.

“General Cullum has gone to Harper’s Ferry, and I have only a single regular officer for duty in the office. Please send some of your officers to-day to see that every precaution is taken at the forks against a raid; also at the bridges.

“H. W. HALLECK,  
“*General-in-chief.*”

“August 30, 1862.

“Franklin’s and all of Sumner’s corps should be pushed forward with all possible despatch. They must use their legs and make forced marches. Time now is everything. Send some sharp-shooters on train to Bull Run. The bridges and property are threatened by bands of Prince William cavalry. Give Colonel Haupt all the assistance you can. The sharpshooters on top of cars can assist in unloading trains.

“H. W. HALLECK,  
“*General-in-chief.*”

"August 30, 1862.

"Sumner's corps was fully in motion by 2.30 P. M., and Franklin's was past Fairfax at 10 A. M., moving forward as rapidly as possible. I have sent the last cavalryman I have to the front; also every other soldier in my command, except a small camp-guard. The firing in front has been extremely heavy for the last hour.

"GEO. B. McCLELLAN,  
"Major-general."

"CENTREVILLE, August 31, 1862.

"Our troops are all here and in position, though much used up and worn out. I think it would perhaps have been greatly better if Sumner and Franklin had been here three or four days ago; but you may rely upon our giving them as desperate a fight as I can force our men to stand up to. I should like to know whether you feel secure about Washington should this army be destroyed. I shall fight it as long as a man will stand up to the work. You must judge what is to be done, having in view the safety of the capital. The enemy is already pushing a cavalry reconnaissance in our front at Cub Run—whether in advance of an attack to-day I don't know yet.

"I send you this that you may know our position and my purpose.

"JNO. POPE,  
"Major-general."

## CHAPTER XII.

### *ADVANCE INTO MARYLAND.*

Purpose of the Invasion of Maryland.—The Army Moves North.—Condition and Spirit of the Troops.—Proclamation Issued.—Jackson Advances on Harper's Ferry.—Its Capture.—McClellan at Frederick.—Lee's Army Order Found.—Position of Confederate Army.—Battle of Boonsboro' Gap.—Federal Success.—Lee's Stand at Sharpsburg.—McClellan Attacks.—The Battle.—Its Results.—Anecdotes of Lee.

BEFORE proceeding with the operations of the Army of Northern Virginia, it is necessary to refer briefly to a portion of the political history of the Confederacy bearing on military affairs.

At the commencement of hostilities the Confederate Government determined to conduct the war purely on defensive principles. In view of the immense superiority of the North over the South in all the essentials for creating armies and the prosecution of war, this was the true policy to be adopted. It must be remembered, however, that a strictly non-aggressive system does not always ensure the best defence; for it frequently happens that a judicious departure from the defensive to bold and energetic offensive measures is productive of the most desirable results, and that it is far better to govern the course of events than to passively yield to its control. At an early period of the war a favorable opportunity occurred for applying the principle above mentioned.

The occasion here referred to is that of the battle of Manassas, in July, 1861, when the defeat of McDowell's army left the Federal capital defenceless. At that time a prompt and vigorous advance of the Confederate army upon Washington City would very probably have resulted in its capture, and a penetration into Maryland would have gained the adherence of that State to the Confederacy. This course, however, was rejected—partly on the ground that the capture of Washington would firmly unite the political parties of the North and obliterate

the hope of a speedy termination of the war, and partly for the reason that the military preparation for an advance was incomplete. This latter objection could have been easily overcome by an energetic commander with the cordial support of the Government. And subsequent events clearly proved that an erroneous conception dictated the timid policy that was pursued.

It is now obvious that the capture of Washington and an invasion of Maryland in 1861 could not have more firmly united the political parties of the North than the mortifying defeat of the army at Manassas had done. Moreover, the year that had since elapsed had been so industriously improved by the Federal Government that the defences of Washington were now complete and the political bonds of Maryland were firmly riveted.

With the view of shedding additional light on this period of the history of the war, we shall here introduce a scrap of personal information. On the 2d of September succeeding Pope's defeat, Colonel Long wrote from the dictation of General Lee to President Davis in substance as follows: As Virginia was free from invaders, the Federal army being within the defences of Washington, shattered and dispirited by defeat, and as the passage of the Potomac could now be effected without opposition, the present was deemed a proper moment, with His Excellency's approbation, to penetrate into Maryland. The presence of the victorious army could not fail to alarm the Federal authorities and make them draw forces from every quarter for the defence of their capital, thus relieving the Confederacy from pressure and—for a time, at least—from the exhaustion incident to invasion. The presence of a powerful army would also revive the hopes of the Marylanders, allow them a free exercise of their sympathies, and give them an opportunity of rallying to the aid of their Southern friends. Above all, the position of the army, should it again be crowned with victory, would be most favorable for seizing and making the best use of the advantages which such an event would produce. In conclusion, a few remarks were made in regard to the condition of the army.

In anticipation of the President's concurrence, General Lee immediately began the preparation for the invasion of Maryland. On the 3d he put the army in motion, and on the 4th took a position between Leesburg and the contiguous fords of the Potomac. The inhabitants of this section of country, having been crushed by the heel of oppression, were now transported with the cheering prospect of liberty. The presence of the army whose movements they had anxiously and proudly watched filled them with unbounded joy. Their doors were thrown open and their stores were spread out in hospitable profusion to welcome their honored guest. Leesburg, being on the border, had at an early period fallen into the hands of the enemy. All of the men who were able had joined the army, and many of those who were unfit for service had retired within the Confederate lines to escape the miseries of the Northern prison; so that the women and children had been left almost alone. Now all these gladly returned to their homes, and tender greetings on every side penetrated to the deepest recesses of the heart and made them thank God that misery and woe had been replaced by happiness and joy.

The strength of the Confederate army at this time, including D. H. Hill's division, did not exceed 45,000 effective men; yet, though it had been greatly reduced in numbers during the campaign through which it had just passed, its spirit was raised by the victories it had achieved. Its numerical diminution was not so much the result of casualties in battle as that of losses incident to long and rapid marches with insufficient supplies of food and the want of shoes. It frequently happened that the only food of the soldiers was the green corn and fruit gathered from the fields and orchards adjacent to the line of march, and often the bravest men were seen with lacerated feet painfully striving to keep pace with their comrades, until, worn out with pain and fatigue, they were obliged to yield and wait to be taken up by the ambulances or wagons, to be carried where their wants could be supplied.

The invasion of Maryland being determined on, the army was stripped of all incumbrances, and, from fear that the soldiers might be induced to retaliate on the defenceless inhabi-

ants for outrages committed by the Federal troops upon the people of the South, stringent orders were issued against straggling and plundering. These orders were strictly enforced throughout the campaign. Lee's earnestness in this particular will be shown later in the chapter.

General Lee at the beginning of this march was suffering from a painful hurt which to some extent disabled him throughout the Maryland campaign. On the day after the second battle of Manassas he was standing near the stone bridge, surrounded by a group of officers, when a squadron of Federal cavalry suddenly appeared on the brow of a neighboring hill. A movement of excitement in the group followed, with the effect of frightening the general's horse. The animal gave a quick start, and his master, who was standing beside him with his arm in the bridle, was flung violently to the ground with such force as to break some of the bones of his right hand. This disabled him so that he was unable to ride during the greater part of the campaign.

The army was at this time in anything but a presentable condition. The long marches, hard fighting, and excessive hardships they had gone through since leaving Richmond had by no means improved the appearance of the men, and, in the words of General Jones, who commanded Jackson's old "Stone-wall" division, "never had the army been so ragged, dirty, and ill provided for as on this march." Yet never were the men in better spirits. They crossed the river to the music of the popular air, "Maryland, my Maryland," while their hearts beat high with hopes of new victories to be won in that far North from which the hosts of their invaders had come, and with desire to wrest their sister-State of Maryland from the iron grasp of the foe. The Marylanders in the ranks felt a natural sentiment of exultation at the cheering prospect of relieving their native commonwealth from what was to them a hateful bondage, while the Virginians—many of whom now looked for the first time on that noble stream which formed the northern boundary of the Confederacy—were filled with joyful expectations of "conquering a peace," perhaps in the fields of Pennsylvania, or at least of making the North suffer in its

own homes some of the horrors of war which it had freely inflicted upon the South.

The passage of the Potomac was successfully accomplished on the 5th. The infantry, artillery, and trains crossed at White's and Cheek's fords, the cavalry having previously crossed with instructions to seize important points and cover the movements of the army. From the Potomac, General Lee advanced to Frederick, at which place he arrived on the 6th and established himself behind the Monocacy. He at the same time seized the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and the principal roads to Baltimore, Washington, Harper's Ferry, and the upper Potomac. From this important position radiated several lines upon which he could operate. Those toward Harper's Ferry, Baltimore, and Pennsylvania were unoccupied, while that in the direction of Washington was held by the Federal army. As the principal object of the present advance into Maryland was to create a diversion in her favor in order that if so disposed she might array herself beside her sister Southern States, General Lee determined to remain at Frederick a sufficient time to allow the Marylanders to rally to his support.

At the commencement of hostilities many brave Marylanders had flocked to the Confederacy, and there were soon seen in the Southern ranks Elzey, G. H. Steuart, Bradley, Johnson, McLean, Marshall, Andrews, and a host of others of a like noble and generous spirit. Many of these gallant gentlemen were now with the army, anxious to assist in rescuing their State from the Federal authority.

On the 7th, General Lee issued the following proclamation.

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY N. VA.,  
Near Frederick Town, 8th September, 1862.

"TO THE PEOPLE OF MARYLAND:

"It is right that you should know the purpose that has brought the army under my command within the limits of your State, so far as that purpose concerns yourselves.

"The people of the Confederate States have long watched with the deepest sympathy the wrongs and outrages that have been inflicted upon the citizens of a Commonwealth allied to

the States of the South by the strongest social, political, and commercial ties.

"They have seen with profound indignation their sister-State deprived of every right and reduced to the condition of a conquered province.

"Under the pretence of supporting the Constitution, but in violation of its most valuable provisions, your citizens have been arrested and imprisoned upon no charge and contrary to all forms of law; the faithful and manly protest against this outrage made by the venerable and illustrious Marylander to whom in better days no citizen appealed for right in vain was treated with scorn and contempt; the government of your chief city has been usurped by armed strangers; your legislature has been dissolved by the unlawful arrest of its members; freedom of the press and of speech has been suppressed; words have been declared offences by an arbitrary decree of the Federal executive, and citizens ordered to be tried by a military commission for what they may dare to speak.

"Believing that the people of Maryland possessed a spirit too lofty to submit to such a government, the people of the South have long wished to aid you in throwing off this foreign yoke, to enable you again to enjoy the inalienable rights of freemen and restore independence and sovereignty to your State.

"In obedience to this wish our army has come among you, and is prepared to assist you with the power of its arms in regaining the rights of which you have been despoiled.

"This, citizens of Maryland, is our mission, so far as you are concerned.

"No constraint upon your free will is intended; no intimidation will be allowed.

"Within the limits of this army at least, Marylanders shall once more enjoy their ancient freedom of thought and speech.

"We know no enemies among you, and will protect all, of every opinion.

"It is for you to decide your destiny freely and without constraint.


"This army will respect your choice, whatever it may be;



MAP OF THE BATTLEFIELD  
OF  
BAPTISTE  
MURRAY.

With Best Wishes of Success  
Routes of My Sept. 11th and  
Sept. Office-Work  
By Schuyler Brereton 1/29 City Trust  
Wm. Chase and Co. N.Y. D. 2  
Tuesday Sept 11th

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and, while the Southern people will rejoice to welcome you to your natural position among them, they will only welcome you when you come of your own free will.

“R. E. LEE,  
“*General commanding.*”

This was coldly received, and it soon became evident that the expectation of hearty co-operation from Maryland was fallacious. The Marylanders as a people sympathized with the Confederates, but stood aloof because they did not wish to see their State become the theatre of war.

It was not without surprise that General Lee discovered, upon reaching Frederick, that Harper's Ferry was still garrisoned. He had expected on entering Maryland that it would be at once abandoned, as it should have been had ordinary military principles been observed. Its continued occupation subjected its defenders to imminent danger of capture. Yet, through a military error, its occupation was unfavorable to the success of the Confederate movement, particularly if there was any idea entertained by General Lee of invading Pennsylvania. It would not do to leave this strongly-fortified post, on the direct line of communication of the army, in possession of the enemy; yet to reduce it needed a separation and retardation of the army that seriously interfered with the projected movements, and might have resulted adversely to the Southern cause but for the rapidity of Jackson's marches and the errors of Colonel Miles, the commander of the garrison. This will appear when we come to describe the subsequent events.

Yet, whatever might be the effect, its reduction was absolutely necessary ere any further operations of importance could be undertaken. Nor could the whole army be judiciously used for this purpose. Not only is it extremely unusual for a commander to use his whole force for a service which can be performed by a detachment, but in this case it would have necessitated a recrossing of the Potomac, with the strong probability that McClellan would take sure measures to prevent a return of the army into Maryland.

This service, had the claims of senior rank been alone

considered, should have been intrusted to Longstreet; but it was given to Jackson on account of his superior qualifications for duty of this character, Longstreet making no objection. Jackson was therefore directed to move his corps on the morning of the 10th by way of Williamsport to Martinsburg, to capture or disperse the Federal force at that place, and then proceed to Harper's Ferry and take steps for its immediate reduction. At the same time, Major-general McLaws was ordered to move with his and Anderson's divisions by the most direct route upon Maryland Heights, to seize that important position and co-operate with Jackson in his attack on Harper's Ferry. Brigadier-general Walker was instructed to recross the Potomac with his division and occupy Loudoun Heights for the same purpose. The several movements were executed with wonderful celerity and precision.

Jackson on leaving Frederick marched with great rapidity by way of Middletown, Boonsboro', and Williamsport, near which latter place he forded the Potomac on the 11th and entered Virginia. Here he disposed his forces so as to prevent an escape of the garrison of Harper's Ferry in this direction and marched upon that place, the rear of which he reached on the 13th. On his approach General White evacuated Martinsburg and retired with its garrison to Harper's Ferry. On reaching Bolivar Heights, Jackson found that Walker was already in position on Loudoun Heights, and that McLaws had reached the foot of Maryland Heights, the key to Harper's Ferry, since it is the loftiest of the three heights by which that place is surrounded, and is sufficiently near to reach it even by musketry. Harper's Ferry, in fact, is a mere trap for its garrison, since it lies open to cannonade from the three heights named; so that the occupation of these renders it completely untenable.

Colonel Miles had posted a small force under Colonel Ford on Maryland Heights, retaining the bulk of his troops in Harper's Ferry. Instead of removing his whole command to the heights, which military prudence plainly dictated, and which his subordinates strongly recommended, he insisted upon a literal obedience to General Halleck's orders to hold Harper's

Ferry to the last extremity. In fact, Maryland Heights was quickly abandoned altogether, Ford but feebly resisting McLaws and retiring before his advance, first spiking his guns and hurling them down the steep declivity. This retreat left Maryland Heights open to occupation by the assailing force, and it was not long ere McLaws had succeeded in dragging some guns to the summit of the rugged ridge and placing them in position to command the garrison below. Jackson and Walker were already in position, and, by the morning of the 14th, Harper's Ferry was completely invested. During the day the summits of the other hills were crowned with artillery, which was ready to open fire by dawn of the 15th.

There was never a more complete trap than that into which the doomed garrison had suffered itself to fall. Escape and resistance were alike impossible. Maryland Heights might easily have been held until McClellan came up had the whole garrison defended it, but its abandonment was a fatal movement. They lay at the bottom of a funnel-shaped opening commanded by a plunging fire from three directions and within reach of volleys of musketry from Maryland Heights. Two hours of cannonade sufficed to prove this, and at the end of that time Colonel Miles raised the white flag of surrender. The signal was not immediately perceived by the Confederates, who continued their fire, one of the shots killing the Federal commander. The force surrendered numbered between 11,000 and 12,000 men, while there fell into Jackson's hands 73 pieces of artillery, 13,000 stand of arms, 200 wagons, and a large quantity of military stores.

Pending the reduction of Harper's Ferry, General Lee moved by easy marches with two divisions of Longstreet's corps to the neighborhood of Hagerstown, leaving D. H. Hill with his division and a detachment of cavalry to serve as rear-guard, with instructions to hold the Boonsboro' pass of South Mountain. By taking a position between Williamsport and Hagerstown a junction could be easily effected with the troops operating against Harper's Ferry, and on the reduction of that place Lee would have a secure line of communication through the Valley of Virginia, which would enable him to advance into

Pennsylvania or to assume such other line of operation as circumstances might suggest.

Since the advance of the Confederate army into Maryland no considerable Federal force had appeared, and as yet only some unimportant cavalry affairs had occurred. After the evacuation of Virginia the Army of the Potomac had been augmented by the addition of the Army of Virginia and that of General Burnside, giving it an effective strength of about 90,000 men. This force was assigned to the command of General McClellan for active operations, and was put in motion about the 6th of September.

Although it was known in Washington that Lee had crossed the Potomac, McClellan was checked in his movements by General Halleck, who was still apprehensive that the ubiquitous Jackson or Stuart might suddenly appear before the city of Washington.

When it became known that Lee had left Frederick and was advancing toward Hagerstown, McClellan advanced with greater confidence, and an attempt was made to relieve Harper's Ferry. Franklin was sent to force his way through Crampton's Pass, in the South Mountain range. This pass was defended by Mumford's cavalry, supported by a part of McLaws's division, under General Cobb, who had been sent back with three brigades under orders to hold Crampton's Pass until Harper's Ferry had surrendered, "even if he lost his last man in doing it." This pass is in the rear of, and but five miles from, Maryland Heights, and its occupation by the Federals would have seriously imperilled the Confederate operations. It was gallantly defended against the strong force of assailants, and, though Franklin succeeded in forcing his way through by the morning of the 15th, he was too late: Miles was already on the point of surrender. McLaws at once withdrew his force from Maryland Heights, with the exception of one regiment, and formed a line of battle across Pleasant Valley to resist the threatening corps. The surrender of the garrison immediately afterward left him a free line of retreat. He crossed the Potomac at the Ferry, and moved by way of Shepherdstown to rejoin Lee at Sharpsburg. The Confederates

had in this enterprise met with the most complete and gratifying success.

The Federal army, moving with great caution and deliberation, reached Frederick on the 12th. Here occurred one of those untoward events which have so often changed the course of wars, and which in this instance completely modified the character of the campaign. A copy of General Lee's order directing the movements of the army accidentally fell into the hands of McClellan, who, being thus accurately informed of the position of the forces of his opponent, at once determined to abandon his cautious policy and boldly assume the offensive. He therefore pressed forward with the view of forcing the South Mountain passes, held by Hill, and of intruding himself between the wings of the Confederate army, with the hope of being able to crush them in detail before they could reunite.

The order in question, addressed to D. H. Hill, was found by a soldier after the Confederate evacuation of Frederick, and was quickly in McClellan's possession. Hill has been blamed for unpardonable carelessness in losing it; yet, as the original order was still in his possession after the war, it is evident that the one found must have been a copy. The mystery is made clear by Colonel Venable, one of General Lee's staff-officers, in the following remark: "This is very easily explained. One copy was sent directly to Hill from headquarters. General Jackson sent him a copy, as he regarded Hill in his command. It is Jackson's copy, in his own handwriting, which General Hill has. The other was undoubtedly left carelessly by some one at Hill's headquarters." However that be, its possession by McClellan immediately reversed the character of his movements, which were changed from snail-like slowness to energetic rapidity. In his own words, "Upon learning the contents of this order, I at once gave orders for a vigorous pursuit."

The detachment by General Lee of a large portion of his army for the reduction of Harper's Ferry was made with the reasonable assurance that that object could be effected and a junction formed before General McClellan would be in position to press him. Though this expectation proved well based, yet it was imperilled by the unforeseen event above mentioned.

The rapid movements to which the finding of Lee's order gave rise brought the leading corps of the Federal army in front of Hill's position upon South Mountain on the afternoon of the 13th. This mountain is intersected by three passes in front of Boonsboro'. The main, or central, pass is traversed by the Frederick and Boonsboro' turnpike; the second, three-fourths of a mile south-east of the first, is crossed by the old Sharpsburg turnpike; the third is an obscure pass behind the elevated crest, about a quarter of a mile north-west of the turnpike.

General Hill's right occupied the south-east pass, and his left held the central. The centre was posted on a narrow mountain-road connecting the right and left. The pass on the left was watched by a small cavalry force. The position of Hill was strong, as it was only assailable by the pike on the left and the road on the right and along the rugged mountain-sides.

Early on the morning of the 14th, General McClellan advanced to the attack, directing his principal efforts against the south-east pass. Hill maintained his position with his usual firmness and intrepidity, and his troops exhibited the same gallantry that had characterized them on various fields.

At this time the position of the several corps of the Confederate army was the following: Jackson was at Harper's Ferry, about fifteen miles from Sharpsburg; Longstreet, at Hagerstown, a somewhat greater distance to the north of Sharpsburg; and D. H. Hill, at Boonsboro' Gap, eastward of these positions; while McClellan's whole force, with the exception of the detachment sent toward Harper's Ferry, lay east of the Gap. Had the Gap been left undefended, as it has been recently suggested it should have been, there would have been nothing to hinder McClellan from inserting his army between the two sections of the Confederate forces and attacking them in detail. The occupation of Sharpsburg by the enemy would have placed Lee in a difficult and dangerous position. Had he retired across the Potomac, as it has been suggested was his proper course to pursue, it would have been a virtual abandonment of his trains and artillery, which were then extended along the road between Hagerstown and Sharpsburg, and could have been reached by McClellan with his cavalry in an hour or two from Boonsboro'.

The battle of Boonsboro' was therefore necessary to the security of the army; and when, on the night of the 13th, Lee received information of the rapid advance of McClellan, he at once took steps for the effective reinforcement of General Hill. Longstreet's corps was put in motion for this purpose early in the morning of the 14th, and, fortunately, arrived at the Gap in time to prevent Hill's brave men from being overwhelmed by the superior numbers of the enemy.

This timely reinforcement secured the Confederate position. McClellan, finding that his efforts against the centre and right were unavailing, at length discontinued them, with the intention of renewing the conflict at a more assailable point. The contest during the morning had been severe and the loss on each side considerable. On the side of the Confederates, the chief loss fell on the brigade of Brigadier-general Garland. This brigade numbered among its slain its gallant commander, who fell while bravely opposing a fierce attack on South-east Pass.

When General Lee reached Boonsboro' with Longstreet's corps, he sent forward Colonel Long, Major Venable, and other members of his staff, to learn the condition of affairs in front. The pass on the left proved to be unoccupied, and a heavy Federal force was tending in that direction. In anticipation of an attack from this quarter, Hood's division was deployed across the turnpike and Rodes's was posted on the ridge overlooking the unoccupied pass, with Evans's brigade connecting his right with Hood's left. There was a small field in front of Evans and Hood, while Rodes was masked by the timber on the side of the mountain. About three o'clock the battle was renewed by McClellan, who with great energy directed his main attack against Rodes. This was successfully resisted until nightfall, when Rodes's troops gave way before the assault of a superior force. The possession of the ground that had been held by Rodes gave the Federals the command of the central pass, but they could not immediately avail themselves of their success, on account of the intervening darkness.

The Confederate position was now untenable, and its evacuation became necessary. The withdrawal of the rear-guard

was assigned to General Rodes, the successful execution of the movement being in a great measure due to the sagacity and boldness of Major Green Peyton, adjutant-general of Rodes's division.


At ten o'clock the next morning the Confederate army was safely in position at Sharpsburg.

At Boonsboro', McClellan had displayed more than usual pertinacity in his attacks upon the Confederate position; yet these were met by the troops of Longstreet and Hill with a firmness worthy of the veterans of Manassas and the Chickahominy. Although Lee had been forced into an unexpected battle when his army was divided, he baffled McClellan in his designs by retarding him so as to gain time for the reduction of Harper's Ferry and to place himself where he could be easily joined by Jackson.

On the morning of the 15th, Harper's Ferry was surrendered, and about noon General Lee received the report of its capture. Two courses now presented themselves to the general, each of which involved results of the highest importance. He might either retire across the Potomac and form a junction, in the neighborhood of Shepherdstown, with the forces that had been employed in the reduction of Harper's Ferry, or maintain his position at Sharpsburg and give battle to a superior force. By pursuing the former course the object of the campaign would be abandoned and the hope of co-operation from Maryland for ever relinquished. The latter, although hazardous, if successful would be productive of results more than commensurate with the risk attending its execution. Having a sympathy for the Marylanders, to whom he had offered his services, and a confidence in the bravery of his troops and the strength of his position, he adopted the latter course, and prepared to receive the attack of General McClellan.

Jackson's troops were hurried from Harper's Ferry and a strong defensive position was carefully selected. It embraced the heights fringing the right bank of the Antietam east and south-east of the village of Sharpsburg and a range of hills stretching north-west to the Potomac. Lee's right and centre were protected by stone fences and ledges of rock, and his left





was principally covered by a wood. The right and centre were occupied by Longstreet's corps, D. H. Hill's division, and Lee's, Walton's, and Garnett's artillery, while Jackson's corps and Stuart's cavalry occupied the left. The Federal forces having been much shattered by the battle of the 14th, McClellan did not resume his advance until late on the morning of the 15th, and did not appear before Sharpsburg until afternoon.

He employed the following day chiefly in preparations for the battle. The corps of Hooker, Mansfield, Sumner, and Franklin, constituting his right, were massed opposite the Confederate left. The hills east of the Antietam which formed the centre of the Federal position were crowned by a powerful artillery, and Burnside's corps, which occupied the left, confronted the Confederate right. Porter's corps formed the reserve, while the cavalry operated on the flanks. Late in the afternoon Mansfield and Hooker crossed the Antietam opposite Longstreet's left. Some preliminary skirmishing closed the day. Both armies now lay on their arms, conscious that the next day would be marked by the most desperate battle that had yet been witnessed in the country. The Confederates, who had never known defeat, confident in themselves, confident in the strength of their position, and confident in their glorious leader, although less in numbers than their opponents by more than one-half, never doubted that victory would again rest on their tattered banners. The Federals, on their part, burning to obliterate the marks of defeat they had lately borne, were impatient for the approaching struggle. The Federal force present on the field amounted to 90,000 men; that of the Confederates, including the division of A. P. Hill, then at Harper's Ferry in charge of prisoners and captured property, amounted to 40,000.

At dawn on the 17th the corps of Mansfield and Hooker advanced to the attack; they were met by the divisions of Anderson and Hood with their usual vigor. Being greatly outnumbered, these divisions were reinforced by Evans's brigade and the division of D. H. Hill. The contest continued close and determined for more than an hour, when the Federals began to give way. They were hotly pressed. Hooker was wounded,

Mansfield was killed, and their corps were irretrievably shattered when relieved by the fresh corps of Sumner and Franklin. The Confederates, who had advanced more than a mile, were gradually borne back to their original position. McClellan now directed his chief attack upon Lee's left, with the hope of forcing it back, so that he might penetrate between it and the river and take the Confederate position in reverse. This attack was received by Jackson's corps with intrepidity. The veterans under Early, Trimble, Lawton, and Starke gallantly held their ground against large odds. At an opportune moment the Confederate line was reinforced by the division of McLaws and Walker. The entire Confederate force, except D. R. Jones's division, on the right, was now engaged.

The roar of musketry and the thunder of artillery proclaimed the deadly conflict that raged. These deafening sounds of battle continued until about twelve o'clock, when they began to abate, and about one they ceased. The Federals had been repulsed at every point, and four corps were so much broken by loss and fatigue that they were unable to renew the contest.

After the battle had concluded on the left General Burnside prepared to assault the Confederate right with 20,000 fresh troops. He had remained inactive during the forenoon; but when the attack on the Confederate left had failed, he proceeded to force the passage of the Antietam at the bridge southeast of Sharpsburg, on the Pleasant Valley road, and at the ford below. These points were gallantly maintained by Toombs's brigade of Jones's division until about four o'clock, when they were carried. General Burnside then crossed the Antietam and formed his troops under the bluff.

At five o'clock he advanced, and, quickly dispersing the small division of D. R. Jones, gained the crest of the ridge south of the town. At that moment the division of A. P. Hill, 4500 strong, just arrived from Harper's Ferry, was on the road which traverses its western slope. Seeing the Federal line on its flank, the division faced to the right, and, taking advantage of the stone fence that bordered the road, delivered such destructive volleys that the Federals were forced to retire as suddenly as they had appeared. Sharply followed by Hill

and raked by the artillery, Burnside was forced to recross the Antietam. Just as the sun disappeared in the west the last of Burnside's corps gained the eastern side. Thus closed the battle of Sharpsburg. The Federal troops fought well and did honor to their gallant leaders, but, being compelled to attack a strong position defended by men who had been justly characterized as the finest soldiers of the age, they failed to obtain the mastery of the field. The casualties on both sides were heavy; the numbers have never been accurately stated. On the side of the Federals were Mansfield killed, Major-general Hooker wounded, and a number of other distinguished officers killed or wounded; on the side of the Confederates, Brigadier-general Starke was killed and Brigadiers Lawton, Ripley, and G. B. Anderson were wounded, and a number of others were put *hors de combat*. Anderson afterward died of his wound.

Among the cases of individual gallantry, one of the most conspicuous was that of General Longstreet, with Majors Fairfax and Sorrell and Captain Latrobe of his staff, who, on observing a large Federal force approaching an unoccupied portion of his line, served with such effect two pieces of artillery that had been left without gunners that the Federals were arrested in their advance and speedily forced to retire beyond the range of the guns.

During the night General Lee prepared for the renewal of the battle the next day. A part of his line was withdrawn to the range of hills west of the town, which gave him a very strong and much better field than that of the previous day. He remained in his new position during the 18th, prepared for battle; but General McClellan, perceiving that his troops had been greatly disorganized by the battle of the previous day, declined resuming the attack until the arrival of 15,000 fresh troops that were hastening to his support.

Foreseeing that no important results could be achieved by a second battle with McClellan's augmented forces, and being unwilling to sacrifice unnecessarily his gallant men, Lee withdrew during the night to the south side of the Potomac, and on the 19th took a position a few miles west of Shepherdstown.

When McClellan learned, on the morning of the 19th, that the Confederate position had been evacuated, he ordered an immediate pursuit, which, however, proved unavailing, as the Confederate rear-guard was disappearing in the defile leading from the ford below Shepherdstown when the Federal advance appeared on the opposite heights. A few batteries were then put into position, and a harmless cannonade commenced, which was kept up in a desultory manner during the greater part of the day. Late in the afternoon a large detachment approached the ford, and about nightfall dislodged General Pendleton, who had been charged with its defence, and effected a crossing without serious opposition. This occurrence was reported about midnight to General Lee, who immediately despatched orders to Jackson to take steps to arrest the Federal advance. The division of A. P. Hill, moving with rapidity, reached the mouth of the defile leading to the river just as the Federal detachment was debouching from it, and attacked this force with such impetuosity that it was compelled to retire with heavy loss across the Potomac. McClellan made no further attempt to continue offensive operations for several weeks, this interval being passed in the neighborhood of Sharpsburg in resting and reorganizing his forces. This campaign, especially the battle of Sharpsburg, has been the subject of much discussion, in which the Northern writers generally claim for the Federal arms a complete victory; but the historian of the Army of the Potomac, with greater impartiality, acknowledges Antietam (or Sharpsburg) to have been a drawn battle. This admission is corroborated by the evidence of General McClellan in his testimony before the Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War, since he admitted that his losses on the 17th had been so heavy, and that his forces were so greatly disorganized on the morning of the 18th, that, although General Lee still maintained a defiant attitude, he was unable to resume the attack. Swinton, however, claims for the Army of the Potomac a political victory, with apparent justice; but in reality his claim is without foundation, for Lee was politically defeated before the occurrence of a collision with McClellan by his failure to induce the Marylanders to rally in any considerable force to

his standard ; and even when McClellan, by accident, became aware of the disposition of his forces and his intentions, he was establishing a line of communication that would enable him to engage his opponent with no other hope of political results than such as would naturally arise from a victory, whether gained north or south of the Potomac. The severe chastisement that had been inflicted on the Army of the Potomac is evident from the long prostration it exhibited, notwithstanding the facility with which it received reinforcements and supplies.

As a relief to the tale of war and bloodshed through which this chapter has carried us, we may relate some incidents of the battle of Sharpsburg of a lighter and more personal character. Lee's position during the engagement was on a hill to the east of Sharpsburg, which gave him an oversight of the whole field. While standing here conversing with Longstreet and attended by some members of his staff, D. H. Hill rode up on an errand to the general. He was admonished to dismount, as his conspicuous appearance might draw the fire of the enemy. He declined to do so, however, as he was in great haste to deliver an important communication. A minute afterward a puff of smoke was seen to rise from a distant Federal battery, and a shell came whirling toward the group. It had been well aimed, and, though a little too low for the horseman, was in the direct line for his horse. It passed very near General Lee, who was standing by the horse's head talking with Hill, and, striking the animal's fore legs, took them both off below the knee. The poor brute fell on his knees, and remained in that position, with his back at an awkward slant, while his startled rider was making ineffectual efforts to dismount. He threw his legs in the usual manner over the cantle of the saddle, but in his haste found it impossible to get off his horse, while the ludicrous spectacle which he presented brought a roar of laughter from the persons present. "Try it the other way," suggested Longstreet. "Throw your legs over the pommel and see if you cannot get off that way." Hill obeyed the suggestion, and finally succeeded in dismounting. He was good-natured enough to take part in the merriment which his adventure had

excited. The shell, however, had not yet finished its death-dealing work. It went on and fell into a Confederate regiment behind a hill, where it killed several men.

Another anecdote of the Sharpsburg engagement is of interest as descriptive of an instance of General Lee's losing his temper—a circumstance which happened only twice, to my knowledge, during my long acquaintance with him. He was not wanting in temper, but was, on the contrary, a man of decided character and strong passions; yet he had such complete control of himself that few men ever knew him to deviate from his habitual calm dignity of mien. On the occasion here alluded to Lee was riding along a little in rear of the lines, when he came across a soldier who had stolen and killed a pig, which he was surreptitiously conveying to his quarters. Positive orders having been given against pillage of every kind, this flagrant disregard of his commands threw the general into a hot passion. Though usually greatly disinclined to capital punishment, he determined to make an example of this skulking pilferer, and ordered the man to be arrested and taken back to Jackson with directions to have him shot. Jackson, on receiving the culprit, could not quite see the utility of his execution, when men were already scarce, and it struck him that it would answer the purpose quite as well to put the fellow in the front ranks of the army at the most threatened point and let the enemy perform the work assigned to him. He accordingly did so, placing him where his chance of being shot was a most excellent one. The fellow, though fond of surreptitious pork, was not wanting in courage, and behaved gallantly. He redeemed his credit by his bravery, and came through the thick of the fight unscathed. If a commonplace witticism be not out of order here, it may be said that, though he lost his pig, he "saved his bacon."

While on the subject of Lee's self-command it may be of interest to quote some incidents from Colonel Taylor's *Four Years with General Lee* as illustrative of his strong power over his feelings even on the most trying occasions:

"Tidings reached General Lee soon after his return to Virginia (from Maryland) of the serious illness of one of his daugh-

ters, the darling of his flock. For several days apprehensions were entertained that the next intelligence would be of her death. One morning the mail was received, and the private letters were distributed, as was the custom, but no one knew whether any home-news had been received by the general. At the usual hour he summoned me to his presence to know if there were any matters of army routine upon which his judgment and action were desired. The papers containing a few such cases were presented to him; he reviewed and gave his orders in regard to them. I then left him, but for some cause returned in a few moments, and with my accustomed freedom entered his tent without announcement or ceremony, when I was startled and shocked to see him overcome with grief, an open letter in his hands. That letter contained the sad intelligence of his daughter's death. . . .

"His army demanded his first thought and care; to his men, to their needs, he must first attend, and then he could surrender himself to his private, personal affairs. Who can tell with what anguish of soul he endeavored to control himself and to maintain a calm exterior, and who can estimate the immense effort necessary to still the heart filled to overflowing with tenderest emotions and to give attention to the important trusts committed to him, before permitting the more selfish indulgence of private meditation, grief, and prayer? 'Duty first' was the rule of his life, and his every thought, word, and action was made to square with duty's inexorable demands."

There is another anecdote told by Colonel Taylor bearing upon the same trait of character and his consideration for the feelings of others, with which this chapter may be closed:

"He had a great dislike to reviewing army communications; this was so thoroughly appreciated by me that I would never present a paper for his action unless it was of decided importance and of a nature to demand his judgment and decision. On one occasion, when an audience had not been asked of him for several days, it became necessary to have one. The few papers requiring his action were submitted. He was not in a very pleasant humor; something irritated him, and he manifested his ill-humor by a little nervous twist or jerk of the neck

and head peculiar to himself, accompanied by some harshness of manner. This was perceived by me, and I hastily concluded that my efforts to save him annoyance were not appreciated. In disposing of some cases of a vexatious character matters reached a climax; he became really worried, and, forgetting what was due to my superior, I petulantly threw the paper down at my side and gave evident signs of anger. Then, in a perfectly calm and measured tone of voice, he said, 'Colonel Taylor, when I lose my temper don't you let it make you angry.'"

Most men in his position would have dealt more severely with the petulance of a subordinate, and not have administered this quiet and considerate rebuke by indicating that the loss of temper was not directed toward him and gave him no warrant for a display of anger.

## CHAPTER XIII.

### *FREDERICKSBURG.*

Lee's Address to the Army.—Stuart's Raid.—Selection of Headquarters.—A Rocky Camp.—Headquarter Incidents.—McClellan Removed.—Burnside Appointed Commander.—Advance on Fredericksburg.—Lee Occupies the Heights.—Burnside Crosses the Rappahannock.—The Battle.—Terrible Slaughter.—Federals Repulsed at all Points.—Retreat Across the River.—Results.—The Winter Camp.—A Practical Joke on the Staff.—A Discriminative Hen.

After remaining a few days in the neighborhood of Shepherdstown, General Lee gradually withdrew to a position between Bunker Hill and Winchester. Notwithstanding he had failed, from accidental causes, to accomplish the chief object of the invasion of Maryland, the expedition was not wholly without beneficial results, since it relieved Virginia from the presence of the enemy and gave her an opportunity to recover in a measure from the exhausting effect of war, while the spirit and confidence of the troops were not impaired by the unexpected termination of the campaign.

In order to explain the achievements of this campaign, I shall here insert General Lee's address to his troops a few days after its termination:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,  
October 2, 1862.

"In reviewing the achievements of the army during the present campaign, the commanding general cannot withhold the expression of his admiration of the indomitable courage it has displayed in battle and its cheerful endurance of privation and hardships on the march.

"Since your great victories around Richmond you have defeated the enemy at Cedar Mountain, expelled him from the Rappahannock, and after a conflict of three days utterly repulsed him on the plains of Manassas and forced him to take

shelter within the fortifications around his capital. Without halting for repose, you crossed the Potomac, stormed the heights of Harper's Ferry, made prisoners of more than 11,600 men, and captured upward of seventy pieces of artillery, all their small-arms, and other munitions of war. While one corps of the army was thus engaged the other ensured its success by arresting at Boonsboro' the combined armies of the enemy, advancing under their favorite general to the relief of their beleaguered comrades.

"On the field of Sharpsburg, with less than one-third his numbers, you resisted from daylight until dark the whole army of the enemy, and repulsed every attack along his entire front of more than four miles in extent.

"The whole of the following day you stood prepared to resume the conflict on the same ground, and retired next morning without molestation across the Potomac.

"Two attempts subsequently made by the enemy to follow you across the river have resulted in his complete discomfiture and his being driven back with loss. Achievements such as these demanded much valor and patriotism. History records fewer examples of greater fortitude and endurance than this army has exhibited, and I am commissioned by the President to thank you in the name of the Confederate States for the undying fame you have won for their arms.

"Much as you have done, much more remains to be accomplished. The enemy again threatens us with invasion, and to your tried valor and patriotism the country looks with confidence for deliverance and safety. Your past exploits give assurance that this confidence is not misplaced.

"R. E. LEE,  
"General Commanding."

The inactivity of General McClellan allowed General Lee several weeks of uninterrupted repose. During that interval the guardianship of the Potomac was confided to the cavalry and horse-artillery. While thus employed General Stuart made a swoop into Pennsylvania, captured a thousand horses, and after making the entire circuit of the Federal army recrossed

the Potomac with only the loss of three missing and three wounded. This achievement drew from Mr. Lincoln a very sarcastic criticism on his own cavalry, which, however, was not wholly merited, for it was no sooner learned that Stuart had crossed the border than Pleasonton made the most rapid pursuit that was ever performed by the Federal cavalry; but he arrived just in time to see the prey safe beyond the Potomac.

Throughout the late campaign the duty of selecting a place for headquarters usually devolved upon the writer. The general would say, "Colonel Long has a good eye for locality: let him find a place for the camp." It was not always so easy to find a desirable situation, but, as the general was easily satisfied, the difficulties of the task were greatly lightened. Only once, to my recollection, did he object to the selection made for headquarters; this was on reaching the neighborhood of Winchester. The army had preceded the general and taken possession of every desirable camping-place. After a long and fatiguing search a farm-house was discovered, surrounded by a large shady yard. The occupants of the house with great satisfaction gave permission for the establishment of General Lee not only in the yard, but insisted on his occupying a part of the house. Everything being satisfactorily settled, the wagons were ordered up, but just as their unloading began the general rode up and flatly refused to occupy either yard or house. No one expected him to violate his custom by occupying the house, but it was thought he would not object to a temporary occupation of the yard. Being vexed at having to look for another place for headquarters, I ordered the wagons into a field almost entirely covered with massive stones. The boulders were so large and thick that it was difficult to find space for the tents. The only redeeming feature the location possessed was a small stream of good water. When the tents were pitched, the general looked around with a smile of satisfaction, and said, "This is better than the yard. We will not now disturb those good people."

While occupying this camp we were visited by several distinguished British officers—among them, Colonel Garnet Wolseley, who has since become prominent in history. Subsequently,

one of the number published the following account of General Lee and his surroundings:

"In visiting the headquarters of the Confederate generals, but particularly those of General Lee, any one accustomed to see European armies in the field, cannot fail to be struck with the great absence of all the pomp and circumstance of war in and around their encampments.

"Lee's headquarters consisted of about seven or eight pole-tents, pitched, with their backs to a stake-fence, upon a piece of ground so rocky that it was unpleasant to ride over it, its only recommendation being a little stream of good water which flowed close by the general's tent. In front of the tents were some three or four army-wagons, drawn up without any regularity, and a number of horses turned loose about the field. The servants—who were, of course, slaves—and the mounted soldiers called couriers, who always accompany each general of division in the field, were unprovided with tents, and slept in or under the wagons. Wagons, tents, and some of the horses were marked 'U. S.', showing that part of that huge debt in the North has gone to furnishing even the Confederate generals with camp-equipments. No guard or sentries were to be seen in the vicinity, no crowd of aides-de-camp loitering about, making themselves agreeable to visitors and endeavoring to save their generals from receiving those who had no particular business. A large farm-house stands close by, which in any other army would have been the general's residence *pro tem.*; but, as no liberties are allowed to be taken with personal property in Lee's army, he is particular in setting a good example himself. His staff are crowded together, two or three in a tent; none are allowed to carry more baggage than a small box each, and his own kit is but very little larger. Every one who approaches him does so with marked respect, although there is none of that bowing and flourishing of forage-caps which occurs in the presence of European generals; and, while all honor him and place implicit faith in his courage and ability, those with whom he is most intimate feel for him the affection of sons to a father. Old General Scott was correct in saying that when Lee joined the Southern cause it was worth

as much as the accession of 20,000 men to the 'rebels.' Since then every injury that it was possible to inflict the Northerners have heaped upon him. Notwithstanding all these personal losses, however, when speaking of the Yankees he neither evinced any bitterness of feeling nor gave utterance to a single violent expression, but alluded to many of his former friends and companions among them in the kindest terms. He spoke as a man proud of the victories won by his country and confident of ultimate success under the blessing of the Almighty, whom he glorified for past successes, and whose aid he invoked for all future operations."

Notwithstanding the ruggedness of this encampment, it proved unusually lively. Besides the foreign friends, we had numerous visitors from the army, also ladies and gentlemen from Winchester and the neighborhood, all of whom had some remark to make upon the rocky situation of our camp. This the general seemed to enjoy, as it gave him an opportunity of making a jest at the expense of Colonel Long, whom he accused of having set him down there among the rocks in revenge for his refusing to occupy the yard. Although there were no habitual drinkers on the general's staff, an occasional demijohn would find its way to headquarters. While at this place one of the officers received a present of a jug of fine old rye. Soon after its advent General J. E. B. Stuart, with Sweeney and his banjo, arrived—not on account, however, of the jug, but, as was his wont, to give us a serenade. The bright camp-fire was surrounded by a merry party, and a lively concert commenced. After a while the general came out, and, observing the jug perched on a boulder, asked with a merry smile, "Gentlemen, am I to thank General Stuart or the jug for this fine music?"

By this time the men had come to know their leader. The brilliant campaigns through which he had led them had inspired them with love and confidence, and whenever he appeared among them his approach was announced by "Here comes Mars' Robert!" and he would be immediately saluted with the well-known Confederate yell, which called forth in other quarters the exclamation, "There goes Mars' Robert—ole Jackson, or an ole hare."

At this time a strong religious sentiment prevailed in the army, and every evening from the various camps might be heard the sound of devotional exercises. General Lee encouraged this sentiment by attending services whenever circumstances permitted.

While indulging in the sweets of repose the army was gradually increased, principally by the return of absentees, until the middle of October, when its effective strength amounted to about 60,000 men. Its efficiency had been much improved by the activity and energy of Colonel Corley, chief quartermaster, and Colonel Cole, chief commissary. These officers displayed great ability in furnishing the necessary requirements of the army in the field. Colonels Chilton, Murray, Henry Peyton, Captains Mason and Latham, of the adjutant- and inspector-general's department, contributed greatly to its high state of discipline, and General Lee made in his report honorable mention of his personal staff.

The cavalry, at this time between 3000 and 4000 strong, was distinguished as the finest corps of modern cavalry, and Stuart had justly become celebrated as a cavalry commander. His brigadiers, the two Lees, W. E. Jones, Robertson, Munford, Hampton, Lomax, and a host of others of less rank, were officers who would have graced the brightest days of chivalry, and the rank and file were composed of the best material of the South.

Stuart was unequalled as an outpost officer. Throughout a line of fifty miles his eye and hand were everywhere present; his pickets and scouts never slept; the movements of the enemy were immediately discovered, and promptly reported to the commander-in-chief.

When McClellan crossed the Potomac, Stuart withdrew his cavalry to a line embracing Bunker's Hill and Smithfield, extending on the right to the Shenandoah and on the left to the eastern base of North Mountain. The connection between this line of outposts and that east of the Blue Ridge was by the way of Snicker's Gap and Berryville. The Federal army by the 15th of October had been concentrated in the neighborhood of Harper's Ferry. The opposing armies were now only

separated by their outposts, between which spirited encounters frequently occurred.

The repose of a month had greatly improved in every way the Confederate army; it had reached a high state of efficiency, and General Lee was fully prepared to meet General McClellan whenever he might think fit to advance to attack him in his position before Winchester. When McClellan resumed active operations two plans presented themselves. One was to bring Lee to an engagement in the Shenandoah Valley; the other, to pass south of the Blue Ridge into Loudoun, Fauquier, and Culpeper, thus penetrating between the Confederate army and Richmond, its base of supplies. The first presented the disadvantage of attacking a formidable opponent in position, while retreat was hazardous by the proximity of two large and difficult rivers, the Shenandoah and Potomac. The other offered a wider scope for the operations of large armies, and in case of defeat, as on previous occasions, the protection of the defences about Washington could easily be gained. McClellan adopted the latter plan, and on the 23d of October commenced the passage of the Potomac south of Harper's Ferry, and by the 1st of November his army had entered Loudoun and was slowly extending into Fauquier. He occupied the line of the Manassas Gap Railroad on the 5th, and at the same time the Federal outposts were extended to the neighborhood of Warrenton. When McClellan had crossed the Potomac and the direction of his advance was ascertained, Lee moved Longstreet's corps and the greater part of the cavalry to a position near Culpeper Court-house and established his outposts along the right bank of the Rappahannock.

Jackson's corps was detained in the Valley until the Federal plans should be more fully developed. The delay that followed the battle of Sharpsburg and the deliberate manner in which McClellan resumed active operations did not accord with the impetuous character of the authorities of Washington, and were productive of a voluminous correspondence with Mr. Lincoln and General Halleck, in which the President and commander-in-chief exhibited marked disapprobation, which culminated in the removal of McClellan. That this step was injudicious

at that time was clearly demonstrated by the subsequent disasters that befell the army.

General McClellan had been in command of the Army of the Potomac more than a year. He had been assigned to its command when it was broken and dispirited by defeat, and had brought it up to a high state of efficiency. In the Peninsular campaign, in the spring of 1862, he accomplished more in two months than any subsequent commander of the Army of the Potomac did in a much greater period. The results of the capture of Yorktown and Norfolk, the destruction of the Merrimac, and the possession of the York and the James rivers were not at the time fully appreciated. They, however, ultimately led to the fall of Richmond and the defeat and capture of the Army of Northern Virginia, and, had not his plans been frustrated by the Federal Executive by withholding at the important moment the co-operation of McDowell's corps of 40,000 men, then at Fredericksburg, this series of operations might have been followed by the capture of Richmond and stamped as one of the most brilliant campaigns on record. After a successful campaign, having reorganized and raised his army in point of numbers and equipment to the highest state of military excellence, and having just entered upon a new field of operation with every element of success that the foresight of a commander could give, General McClellan was relieved from command and placed in retirement. The impression created at the time was that this step was a military necessity, but the course afterward displayed by the radical party would naturally lead to the inference that the removal of McClellan originated from political jealousy. His great personal popularity and his influence with the Democratic party, enhanced by military fame, would have made him a formidable political aspirant.

A great diversity of opinion exists as to the military capacity of McClellan, and he has been both unduly praised and censured by his friends and foes. That his slowness and caution were elements on which the opposing general might safely count must be admitted, but that he had a high degree of military ability cannot be denied. His skill in planning movements was certainly admirable, but their effect was in more

than one instance lost by over-slowness in their execution. In this connection it will be of interest to give General Lee's own opinion concerning McClellan's ability, as related by a relative of the general, who had it from her father, an old gentleman of eighty years:

"One thing I remember hearing him say. He asked General Lee which in his opinion was the ablest of the Union generals; to which the latter answered, bringing his hand down on the table with an emphatic energy, 'McClellan, by all odds!'"

This opinion, however, could but have referred to his skill as a tactician, as it is unquestionable that Lee availed himself of McClellan's over-caution and essayed perilous movements which he could not have safely ventured in the presence of a more active opponent.

It was with surprise that the Confederate officers who knew the distinguished merit of Sumner, Sedgwick, Meade, and others learned that Burnside had been elevated above them, and General Burnside himself with diffidence accepted the high honor that had been conferred upon him. Mr. Lincoln, accompanied by General Halleck, visited the headquarters of the army near Warrenton, where a plan of operations was adopted. A rapid advance upon Richmond by the way of Fredericksburg was advised. It was supposed from the position of General Lee's forces that by gaining a march or two upon him Richmond might be reached and captured before that general could relieve it. All that prevented the immediate execution of this plan was the want of a pontoon-train, which was necessary for the passage of the Rappahannock.

Having arranged to his satisfaction with General Halleck and Mr. Lincoln in regard to a prompt compliance with his requisitions for pontoons and supplies for the army, General Burnside, about the 15th of November, put the Army of the Potomac in motion, and on the 17th, Sumner's corps reached Fredericksburg. This energetic officer would probably have immediately crossed the Rappahannock by the fords above the town, and thus have saved much delay. He was, however, restrained by Burnside, who directed him to await the arrival

of the pontoons. At this time the river in the neighborhood of Fredericksburg was held simply by a small picket-force, and could have been forded without much difficulty. General Lee, having penetrated the designs of the Federal commander, prepared to oppose them. About the 18th he sent reinforcements to Fredericksburg with instructions to retard, as far as practicable, the Federal forces in the passage of the Rappahannock, and at the same time he sent orders to Jackson to join him as speedily as possible.

Upon the supposition that Burnside would cross the Rappahannock before he could form a junction of his forces, Lee proposed to take a position behind the North Anna with part of Longstreet's corps, the force then about Richmond, and such other troops as might be drawn from other points, while, with Jackson's and the remainder of Longstreet's corps united, he moved in such a manner as might enable him to fall upon the flank and rear of the Federal army when it attempted the passage of that river. But when it was ascertained that Burnside was prevented from immediately crossing the Rappahannock by a delay in the arrival of his pontoons, Lee determined to move Longstreet's corps immediately to Fredericksburg and take possession of the heights opposite those occupied by the Federal force, as these heights afforded a stronger defensive line than the North Anna.

In execution of this determination Longstreet's corps left the vicinity of Culpeper Court-house on the 24th, crossed the Rappidan at Raccoon Ford, and, proceeding by the Wilderness road, reached Fredericksburg the next day. In the meantime, Jackson was rapidly approaching from the Valley. The Army of the Potomac had been a week before Fredericksburg and the pontoons had not yet arrived, and what might have been effected a few days before without opposition could now be accomplished only by force. Even after passing the river Burnside would be obliged to remove from his path a formidable opponent before he could continue his advance upon the city of Richmond.

On arriving at Fredericksburg, General Lee caused the heights south of the river to be occupied by artillery and in-

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# SKETCH

OF THE ACTIONS  
SALEM CHURCH AND FREDERICKSBURG

MAY 22-23, 1863.


Prepared by order of General R. E. Lee

BY

J. B. MOTON

Topographic Engineer

Confederates - - - - -  
Federals - - - - -



fantry from Banks's Ford, four miles above, to the Massaponax, five miles below the city, while the cavalry extended up the river beyond the United States Ford and down as far as Port Royal. The prominent points were crowned with artillery covered by epaulments, and in the intervals were constructed breastworks for the protection of infantry. The heights closely fringe the river from Banks's Ford to Falmouth; thence they recede, leaving a low ground, which gradually increases in width to about two miles; then the hills again abut upon the river a little below the mouth of the Massaponax, and, extending nearly parallel to that stream, abruptly terminate in broad, low grounds. These low grounds are traversed by the main road to Bowling Green and are intersected by several small streams. The most important of these is Deep Run, which empties into the Rappahannock a little more than a mile above the mouth of the Massaponax. That portion of the road embraced between Deep Run and the Massaponax is enclosed by embankments sufficiently high and thick to afford good covers for troops. We have here endeavored to describe some of the principal features of the Confederate position at Fredericksburg, that the plan of battle may be more clearly understood.

Jackson's corps on its arrival at the end of November was posted a few miles south of the Massaponax, in the neighborhood of Guinea Station on the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad. From this position he could easily support Longstreet, or, in case Burnside attempted a passage of the Rappahannock between the Massaponax and Port Royal, he would be ready to intercept him. After much delay the pontoon-train reached Fredericksburg. But then the position of Lee presented a formidable obstacle to the passage of the river at that point.

General Burnside thereupon caused careful reconnoissances to be made both above and below, with the view of finding a more favorable point for crossing. But he invariably found wherever he appeared the forces of General Lee ready to oppose him. Finding no part of the river more suitable or less guarded than that about Fredericksburg, Burnside determined to effect a crossing at that place. Two points were selected—one oppo-